ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
cising the functions of an office, in any
new mode, not hitherto found in the
cases, the principle must be made to
embrace the new case, or else by refusing it, we virtually deny the soundness of the rule itself. This figure of
speech, by which we put a part for the
whole, or the whole for a part, must
have existed in all the countries from
which we inherit our culture and our
language, since theveryterm synecdoche,
by which it is called, is substantially
Greek, in form as well as import. And
there is, perhaps, no figure of speech in
more common use, and especially by
laii writers. They feel that it is not
always safe to go much beyond the decided cases, and hence they adopt language merely embracing such cases as
have already arisen, without very dis-
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tinctly enunciating the general principle
involved, but at the same time having
no purpose of denying or restricting it ;
feeling that it will be time enough to
embrace any new case when it arises.
This is one of the great excellencies
of the unwritten law above a written
code. The general principles of the
former are allowed to embrace new
cases as they arise, without regard to
the enumerations already made under
it; while the latter having been reduced
to formal definitions, necessarily excludes all not anticipated at the time
these definitions were made. We are
conscious we have added very little to
the clearness of the principle involved
in the opinion, and are sure we need
I. F. R.
attempt no more.
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SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.
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SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND.
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COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.
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ADMIRALTY.
Collsion-Pilotin harge under State Law.-Tbe fact that a steamship is in charge and under the control of a pilot taken on board con.
formably to the laws of the state, is not a defence to a proceeding in
rem against her for a tortious collision; the laws of the state providing
only that if a ship coming into her waters, refuse to receive on board
and pay a pilot, the master shall pay the refused pilot half-pilotage, and
no penalty for the refusal being prescribed : The China (7 Wallace 58)
affirmed: Tie Merrimac, 14 Wall.
I From
2 From
3 From
4 From
AFrom

J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 14 of his Reports.
Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 57 Ills. Rep.
J. S. Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 36 Md. Rep.
C. E. Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 8 of his Reports.
Hon. 0. A. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 30 or 31 Wis. Rep.
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Dereiictv'essc-Saivor.---Thc
master, officers and crew ofa vessel. witLi
every person on board, having gone off in extrenie anxiety for their personal safety from the vessel on to another which they had brought to them
by signals of distress, the mere expressed intention bythe master to employ
if possible a tug to go and rescue his vessel (she then lying at anchor in
a violent gale), to which expression of intention, the person to whom it
was made replied, that he 11could not get a tug that would come and
bring the boat in, as the weather was too rough," was held not sufficient
to deprive the vessel of the character of a derelict, so far as timey effort
to save her was contemplated: ?le Laura, 14 Wall.
A vessel undertaking in good faith to perform the office of salvor io a
derelict vessel held not responsible for the latter having been wholly lost
in the effort to save her : Id.
Collision-Lightsat Night-Regulations as to Lights binding on Tessels on the 1Hqh Seas-Suit by Foreign against American Vessd for
Violation of United States Regultions as to Lights.-The statutes of the
United States and the Orders in Council of Great Britain having each
prescribed the sort of lights which, on the one hand, their steamers are
to carry at night, and the different sort which, on the other, their sailingvessels are to carry, and both nations adopting in this form the same
distinction in the sorts of lights for the two sorts of vessels respectively,
the court declares that where a British steamer and an American sailingvessel are navigating at night in the known path of vessels navigating
between the United States and Great Britain, so that there is a reasonable probability that vessels in that path would be either American or
British, a steamer may, in the absence of knowledge, act upon the probability that a vessel whose light she sees while she cannot distinguish
at all the vessel herself, is such a vessel as her light indicates, and apply
the rule of navigation common to the two countries accordingly; Thd
Scotia, 14 Wall.
Under the existing statutory regulations of the United States and
Great Britain, both of which on the one hand require sailing-vessels to
carry colored lights and not to carry a white one, and both of which on
another require steamers to carry a white light at their mastheads,when an American sailing-vessel carries in mid-ocean at night a white
light hung at her bow, fastened low down, and carries no colored light,
anywhere, a British steamer, not able to discover what she really is,
may be excused for mistaking her for a steamer, and a steamer at a dis
tance instead of near at hand: Id.
Semble that the navigation laws of the United States requiring differ
ent sorts of vessels to carry different sorts of lights, bind American vesmels on the high seas as-well as in American waters, and that the people
of other nations navigating the high seas may properly sue our citizens
in our courts for injuries occurring through the disreggrd of them: .'d.
The rules of navigation established in the British Orders in Council,
of January 9th 1863 (prescribing the sorts of lights to be used on British vessels), and in our Act of Congress of 1864, having, before the
close of the year 1864, been accepted as obligatory by more than thirty
of the principal commercial states of the world, including almost all
which have any shipping on the Atlantic Ocean, were, in April 1867, to
be regarded, so far as relates to the vessels of these states, as laws of the
sea. A nd of the hbiwri, 1 fact that by common vons.
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they have been acquiesced in as of general obligation, courts may take
judicial notice: Id.
These rules having prescribed that sailing-vessels should not carry a
white light, and that steamers should carry one at their masthead, a
sailing-vessel which carried a white light low down, so that she looked
like a steamer yet at a distance, was held to be without remedy where
she had collided with a steamer which mistook her for another steamer
and manceuvred accordingly : Id.
AGENT.

See Mortgage.

BANKRUPTCY.

Claim of Assignee against Transferee of Property.-Where an assignee in bankruptcy claims a fund as the property of his bankrupt,
which some time before the bankruptcy a firm of which the bankrupt
was a member transferred to a third party, and which the transferee
now claims adversely to the assignee, the proceedings in the District
Court should not be summary and under the first section of the Bankrupt Act, but formal and under the second clause of the third section:
Smith v. Mason, Assignee, 14 Wall.
BUILDING Assoc.iATIoN.

Finesfor the Non-pagment of Dues.-Where a mortgage given to a
Homestead or Building Association by one of its members, recognises
the obligation of the fines which may be imposed upon him by the association, and stipulates for their payment, a court of equity, when called
upon to foreclose the mortgage ex parte or otherwise, ought to allow in
the ascertainment of the indebtedness of the mortgagor, such reasonable and legal fines as may have been incurred by him, by his own consent, when he has been in default: Shannon v. .oward Mutual Building Assoc., 36 Md.
Such fines do not come within the principle which forbids a court of
equity to lend its assistance to enforce the payment of fines, penalties
or forfeitures: Id.
CHATTEL

IORTGAGE.

COLLISION.

See Mortgage.

See Admiralty.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Criminal.Law; Supreme Court.
Taking private Propertyfor public use-Ent, on Land by Railroad
onipanay-Payment of Damages.-Private property cannot be entered
upon and permanently occupied for public use, without the consent express or implied of the owner, until its value has been ascertained by
some legal and proper proceeding, nor until such value has been paid to
him, or an adequate and safe fund provided for his compensation:
Bolnzan v. G. B. & Lake _Pepin Railroad Co., 30 or 31 Wis.
Where such taking is by a private corporation (as a railroad company).
the ascertained compensation must be tendered to the owner, and, in
case he declines to receive it, must be deposited with some proper person
to be kept for such owner until he shall apply for it: Id.
An attempt to enter upon the land in such a case, without the damage
for its taking having been duly ascertained and tendered, will ordina.
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rily be restrained by injunction on the application of the party whose •
rights are threatened : 1(d.
Ch. 175, Laws of 1861, 1 Tay. Stats. 1043-41, §§ 32. 33, declares
that "any person owning or interested in any land upon which the track
of any railroad shall have been constructed, or which shall have been
appropriated by any railroad company without compensation having
been made therefir. shall have the right to have commissioners appointed," &c., and that "no injunction shall be granted by any court to
prevent the use or occupancy of such land by any railway company,"
until the amount of damages to whiah any owner, &c , is entitled,
" shall have first been liquidated or final judgment rendered therefor."
Held, 1. That this statute must be regarded as intended to apply only
to cases where land has been actually occupied by the company with its
track constructed, or with depots or other structures erected thereon and
wed by the company, and where this has been done with either the
express or implied consent of the owner. 2. That if applied to a case
like the present. where the company merely entered by force, against
the owner's protest, and commenced preparing the land as a road-bed,
the act would be invalid : Id.
The mere fict that a road has been surveyed and located over land,
without any protest on the part of the owner, or any attempt by him to
have commissioners appointed to assess his damages, does not give the
company any right, under said act, to enter upon and permanently oncupy the land : id.
CONTRACT. See Usage.
Aotive-Consderation-Partnerslp.-Inthe matter of a contract, a
distinction sometimes exists between a motive which may induce entering into it and the actual consideration of the contract. Ex. gr. A
person, in virtue of some benefit passing to him, may be bound to give
for it his promissory note for a certain sum and payable at a certain
time, and yet refuse to give the note. Now, if upon an expectation of
some particuhr results in another transaction into which expectation he
is led by his creditor in the original transaction, he gives the note, the
original benefit to him, and not the expectation, must be regarded as the
consideration of the note: Philplot v. Graninlger, 14 Wall.
A consideration moving to A. and B., with whom C. afterwards enters
into partnership, and of which consideration C. thus gets the benefit,
will support a promise by C. : Id.
On an issue between a partnership and third parties as to the day
when the partnership was formed, the mere articles of partnership are
not evidence in favor of the partnership. It must be shown by extrinsic
evidence. that they were made on the day when they purport to have
been made: Id.
CORPORATION.
Subscription to Stock-Liability of Stockhuder-Estoppel.-Wherea
stockholder in a manufacturing company. incorporated under Article 26
of the Code of Public General Laws, knowing that the whole capital
stock has not been subscribed, participates in the organization of the
company, attends its meetings, is one of the directors, and privy to
the contracting of a debt by the company, he will not be heard in an
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action against him to enforce his individual liability for the debt, to the
extent of the stock subscribed for by him, to deny the regularity of the
organization of the company, or to set up as a defence a partial subicription of the capital stock: Hager v. Cleveland, 36 Md.
COVENANT.

Warranty Deed-Outstanding Tax Certificate-Damages-Ei7ciion.-A tax certificate outstanding at the date of a conveyance by
warranty deed, is a breach of the covenant against encumbrances: Eaton
v. Lyman, 30 or 31 Wis.
In an action upon the covenants of such deed, the grantee (or his
assignee of the right of action) is entitled to recover the amount necessarily expended by him in removing the encumbrance, not exceeding the
purchase-price of the land. If the grantee has not removed the encumbrance, he may still maintain the action and recover nominal damages:
Id.
Whether after the recovery of nominal damages in such a case, the
grantee or his assignee could maintain a subsequent action for actual
damage afterwards suffered from the existence of such encumbrance, is
not here decided: Id.
Proof that the grantee has been evicted does not show a breach of the
covenant of warranty, without showing either under what title the plaintiff in the action against said grantee claimed, and that the same was in
fact paramount to the title of his grantor, or that the said grantor was
bound by the judgment in that action: Id.
CRIMINAL LA-W.

"Due Process of Law"-Iformations- Grand Juries.-The first
clause of § 8 of art. 1 of the Constitution of this state, which declared
that no person should be held to answer for a criminal offence "unless
on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury" (except in certain
specified cases), was amended in 1870 so as to declare that no person
shall be so held to answer "without due process of law." Held, 1. That
in view of the history of this section, and the known purpose of its
amendment, the words "due process of law" therein cannot be held to
require, in cases offelony, a presentment or indictment by a grand jury.
2. That so much of ch. 137, Laws of 1871, as provides that the courts
of this state shall possess the same power and jurisdiction to try prosecutions upon informations for all crimes, as they possess in cases of like
prosecution upon indictment, is not in violation of said section as
amended: .Rowan v. State, 30 or 31 Wis.
The 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which
declares that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law," was not designed, and does not have
the effect, to prevent the states from punishing felonies by criminal informations without presentment or indictment by a grand jury; but, as
'respects the punishment of crimes, the amendment merely requires that
this shall be effected through courts of justice, by regular judicial proceedings therein, previously prescribed by law: Rd.
The provision of § 12 of said ch. 137, that "in any indictment or
information for murder it shall be sufficient to charge that the accused
lid wilfully, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, kill and murder

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

the deceased; and in any indictment or information for manslaughter,
it shall be sufficient to charge that the accused did feloniously kill and
slay the deceased," is valid, and is not in violation of § 7, art. 1 of the
state Constitution, which secures to the accused the right "to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him :" Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See Mortgage.

EASEMENT.

Right of Way-NAotice of-Where a party purchased a right of way,
and received a written instrument to evidence the fact, and both sides
of the way were fenced, and it was in constant use by him, for the purposes of a way, although the writing was not recorded, these facts constitute such notice to a subsequent purchaser as to prevent him from
holding the right of way: McCann et al. v. Day, 57 111.
In such case equity has jurisdiction, as the injured party has no adequate remedy at law, and will perpetually enjoin such purchaser from
obstructing the right of way: Id.
EQUITY.

See Building Association; Easement.
ERROR.

Wrong Interpretationof Statute- Change of Statute before Judgment
of Court of Error.-Though error may have been committed by a court
below on the then state of statutory law, yet where a statute has been
passed since that court gave their judgment, changing the then existing
law, so that if the judgment were reversed and the case sent back, the
court would now, and in virtue of the new statute, have to rightly give
the same judgment that they gave before erroneously, this court will
affirm : Pugh v. Mc Cormick, 14 Wall.
ESTOPPEL. See Cor'oration.
Wthen a Party is not estopped from slowng tLe Truth.-A party is
not estopped by his acts or declarations from showing the truth, unless
such acts or declarations were intended to influence the conduct of another, or he had reason to believe that they would influence the conduct
of another: Kuhl v. Tie Mayor of Jersey City, 8 C. E. Green.
A receipt for taxes on real properties given by a tax collector on
receiving a check, does not estop him from showing that the check
was unpaid, although a purchaser was induced by such receipt to pay
Ehe whole consideration. The collector did not give the receipt, knowing that it would be used for such purpose, nor does the mere giving of
a receipt, which is only a voucher of payment between the parties and
always liable to be disproved, raise the presumption that it will be used
t') defraud a purchaser: Id.

EVIDENCE.

See Contract; Husband and Wife.
EXECUTORS.

Suits in Equity by and against Parties.-Wbereexecutors are directed
by the will to pay money into the estate, and personally bound so to do,
and are directed out of such fund to pay a legc.ay to a co-executor, but
Fail to pay the money into the estate, such co-executor may bring suit
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ina court of equity, in his individual right, against the executors individually to compel the payment of the legacy : Evans v. Evans, 8 C. .
Green.
In any suit which necessarily should be brought by a complainant as
executor against the defendants as such, if the allegations in the bill
are sufficient to bring them before the court in that character, it is not
necessary that they should be styled such, either in the process or in
the commencement of the bill, or in the prayer for process: Id.
Ordinarily it is not necessary to make debtors of the decedent parties
to a bill against the executors by creditors or legatees. But where there
is collusion alleged or suspected between the executor and the debtors,
or he refuses to collect the debts, they are proper parties, and in case
of a charge upon real estate, the heirs or devisees are proper parties
with the personal representatives : Id.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.

Possession of Plaintif--Joint Tenants.-In this form of action, two
questions must arise, first, as to the exclusive possession of the plaintiff,
and second, the invasion of his possession by the defendant: Jamison.
v. Graham, 57 Ills.
Where there was evidence tending to show both plaintiff and defendant used the premises jointly, as a pasture, it was error in the court to
instruct the jury, that the plaidtiff might recover, if he was in possession,
without reference to defendant being also in possession. The instructions should have informed the jury that plaintiff, to recover, should
have had exclusive possession : Id.
To maintain an action of fbrcible entry and detainer, it is not necessary that the plaintiff should have a pedis possessio; it is sufficient, if
the premises are used and occupied for some useful purpose; but if such
possession is joint, as to different persons, neither one would be entitled
to the exclusive possession : Id.
Even if one joint tenant could maintain this action against another,
who has taken exclusive possession, still that could not apply to a case
where the parties occupy the premises jointly, and one party seeks to
recover the entire premises, to the exclusion of the other. One joint
tenant cannot recover the exclusive possession of the premises against
his co-tenant: Id.
HIGHWAY.

Townships-Liability to a Private Action for .Neglect of.Duty in
townships, established by law
keeping Highsway's in .pair.-Organized
as civil divisions of counties merely, are not liable, in their corporate
capacity, to a private action for damages occasioned by their neglect to
keep their public highways in repair: Bussell, Adm'r.. v. Town of
Steuben, 57 Ills.
See Building Association.
HOMESTEAD.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

flarriagebetween Slaves-Evidence as to Pedigree-Act of 1868, ch.
116, relating to the Comnpetency of Witnesses.-David Jones, a slave,
intermarried with a free woman; subsequently, in 1819, he became free
by deed of manumission; the parties lived together as man and wife,
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and acknowledged and treated each other as such, and were so recog
nised by all who knew them, long after his emancipation, and up to the
time of his wife's death. They had children. A brother of David who
became free by manumission in 1815, died in August 1870 intestate, possessed of a large personal estate, leaving a widow but no child, and no
relatives other than the children of his brother David, who had died some
years previously. On a petition filed by the children of David Jones,
claiming a distributive share of the intestate's estate, it was held, that
the marriage of David Jones was valid, and his children were entitled
to one-half of their uncle's estate, his wife being entitled to the other
half: Jones v. Jones and others, 36 Md.
A marriage between slaves is made valid by the ratification of the par
ties after they become free: Id.
Declarations of deceased members of a family as to pedigree, are
always admissible in evidence: -rd.
On a petition by the nephews and nieces of an intestate, claiming to
be his next of kin and heirs at law, and asking to share in the distribution of his estate, the whole of which was claimed by his wife to whom
letters of administration had been granted, the petitioners are not incompetent as witnesses under the Act of 1868, ch. 116 : Id.
INSURANCE.

By Partnersipfor Individual Benefit of one Partner- Concealment.
-Insurance may be effected in the name of a nominal partnership where
the business is carried on by and for the use of one of the partners;
6specially when the property insured (grain) is held by the parties
insured on commission only, and in the policy is described " as held by
them in trust or on commission, or sold and not delivered :" P/uani
Insurance Com, any v. Hamilton, 14 Wall.
In case of an insurance thus effected, where no representations are
made with regard to the persons who compose the firm; there is no misrepresentation on that subject which avoids the policy: Id.
And where the firm has no actual care or custody of the property
insured (grain), but so far as regards its preservation from fire, it is
entirely in the control of the other parties, and is so understood to be
by the company making the insurance; the omission to inform the
insurance company of an agreement of dissolution previously made cannot be considered a concealment which will avoid the policy: Id.
INTEREST.
MALICIOUS

See Mortgage.
PROSECUTION.

Probable Cause-When Malice mays be inferred-Inadmissible Biideace to show Absence of f.alce.-Where a party against whom a charge
of larceny is preferred, is acquitted and discharged after a full investigation by the magistrate who issued the warrant for her arrest, such
acquittal and discharge are primdfacie evidence of the want of probable
cause for the prosecution, sufficient to throw, upon the prosecutor, in an
action against him for malicious prosecution by the party against whom
he made the charge, the burden of proving there was probable caise
Md.
Straus v. Young, 36
Malice may be inferred from the want of probable cause for a prosPzution : Id.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

In an action for malicious prosecution, malice on the part of the
defendant may be inferred from his zeal and activity in conducting the
prosecution against the plaintiff: Id.
In an action for malicious prosecution, proof that the defendant acted
under the advice of a magistrate, or other person not learned in the law,
is not admissible for the purpose of showing the absence of malice: Id.
MORTGAGE.

Deed of Trust-Sale under, by Agent-PriorLien-Euity.-Notwithstanding an agent appointed by a trustee, with a power to sell the
trust property, cannot legally sell it in the absence of the trustee, still, a
person holding simply the legal title, without having any equitable
interest whatever in the trust property, cannot in equity question such
a sale: Beach v. Shaw, 57 Ills.
Where a prior mortgage falls due, and the property is sold by a trustee under a power in the deed, and a junior mortgagee becomes the purchaser at such sale, pays the money and enters into possession of the
property and continues the possession: Held, such a person will not be
disturbed by a person clothed merely with a naked legal title, but having no equitable rights; nor can such person redeem from the sale under
the mortgage: Id.
Where the assignee bid in the trust property in the name of his clerk,
and paid the sheriff the amount of the judgment out of the trust funds
in his hands, that operated simply as a satisfaction of the judgment, and
let in the junior encumbrance next in rank to the first mortgage on the
property, and if the purchaser from the first mortgagor, were to be
allowed to redeem, he would be required to pay not only the bid by the
second mortgagee under the sale on the first mortgage, but the amount
of the second mortgage to him: Id.
As a general rule, the holder of the legal estate under the mortgagor
is a proper person to redeem, whether he holds as trustee for others or
in his own right by a voluntary conveyance from the mortgagor, but
when such grantee asks something more than the mere right to redeem,
as to set aside a sale previously made under the mortgage, on the ground
of irregularity in conducting it, but which was fair, and at which a third
party became a purchaser in good faith, and the sum paid with his own
encumbrance exceeded the value of the property, such holder of the
legal title must show that he has equities before he can redeem: Id.
Deed absolute on its face, but held for Security only-Burden of
Proof.-An answer, though responsive on the point in controversy,
sworn to before an officer in another state, not authorized by the statutes
of this state or the rules of this court to take an oath to an answer, has
no weight as evidence; it must be treated as a pleading only:
eytag
v. Holland, 8 C. E. Green.
When the controversy is as to the fact whether a deed was intended
as sevurity only, the burden of the proof is on the grantor, and his
oath against that of the grantee would not be sufficient to change a deed
absolute on its face into a mortgage: Id.
But where the mortgagee admits that he required an absolute deed
as security for a debt, without any recital to show what the debt was,
and the mortgagor testifies that the consideration expressed in tlw
VOL. XXI.-13
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was the debt it was intended to secure, the burden of proof is on the
mortgagee to show that it was given as security for a greater amount: Id.
The grantee in such case must reconvey on payment of his debt. and
if the net rents and profits exceed the amount the deed was given to
secure and interest, he must repay such excess : Id.
Secrity-Tax Certificates-Trfst.-Whereone holds the legal title
to land for another and as security for money advanced, if he buys
in the tax certificates, he holds those also in trust, and is entitled, as
against the cestid que trust, to interest upon the amount paid therefor,
only at seven per cent., and not at twenty-five per cent., the rate which
such certificates bear, by statute, where no such trust relation exists:
Fisl v. Brnette, 30 or 31 Wis.
Judgmeut that plaintiff be permitted to redeem land upon payment
of a certain sum found due from him to defendant on an accounting,
should provide also for interest on such sum from the rendition of the
judgment to the time of payment: 11.
Where the action was to enforce an absolute right to the land, and it
appeared that defendant had a right to redeem, but had not tendered
the amount due, judgment affirming the right of redemption should be
without costs to either party : Id.
Of Chattels-Delivery-RecordIig.-A chattel mortgage is required
to be filed or recorded only when the mortgagor retains possession of the
property: Morrow v. Reed et al., 30 or 31 Wis.
Where there is some irregularity in the filing or recording of the
mortgage, or it fails to duly describe the property, or covers property to
be subsequently acquired, such defects are all cured by a subsequent
delivery of the property to the mortgagees, as against parties who have
not acquired paramount rights before such delivery: Id.
The delivery in such a case must be such an actual transfer of the
possession and control of the property that if it were destroyed the loss
would be that-of the mortgagee: Id.
Where the property is bulky and incapable of manual delivery, as in
the case of logs, it is sufficient that the mortgagor goes with the mortgagee to the place where it lies, and points it out to the latter as the
property included in the mortgage, and which he thereby transfers to
the mortgagee's possession: Pd.
Where the agreement for the sale of logs is, that the vendee shall
take title to them as soon as they are gotten out and deposited in a certain place, the title will pass when the logs are deposited at the place
designated (if that was the intention of the parties in making the contract), even though the vendor is still required to scale them: Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Streets-Grade-Repairs.-Acity has full control over the grade of
its streets, and may adopt such angle as the authorities may choose, and
may lower or elevate it at will, and the owners of lots adjacent to the
street cannot call it to account for errors of judgment in fixing the grade,
or recover damages for inconvenience or expenses produced in adjusting
the level of their premises with the street. But a city has no more
power over its streets than a private person has over his own land, and
rhe city, under the plea of public convenience, cannot be allowed to

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

exercise that dominion, to the injury of the property of another, in a
mode that would render an individual liable to damages, without itself
becoming responsible. The rule of law which protects the right of property of one individual against another individual, must protect it from
similar aggressions on the part of municipal corporations: aty of Aurora
v. Reed, 57 Ill.
If a city, in fixing the grade of a street, turns a stream of water and
mud on the grounds or cellar of a citizen, or creates in his neighborhood
a stagnant pond that generates disease, it becomes liable to respond in
damages: Id.
Where the city, through its proper officer, fixes the grade of a street,
and property-owners improve the street under the direction of the officer,
and the improvement of the street is so made that water from rains and
melting snow runs to and discharges itself over a lot owned by an individual, the city is liable for damages. The city has no right to turn
surface-water on private property, nor does it change the principle that
the street was improved before the lot was. Nor does it change the liability of the city, .by showing that other property-owners on the street
filled up a portion thereof in front of their lots, so as to turn the water
on plaintiff's house. If the officials of a city permit persons to place
obstructions in the streets, the city will be liable for injury resulting
therefrom : Id.
It is no defence to show that plaintiff might have dug ditches that
would have protected his property; he was under no legal obligation to
do so, and the city was. It was the duty of the city to provide proper
sewerage to carry off such water. It is armed with ample power to provide proper means therefor; if necessary, it could condemn ground for
the construction of sewers, or use the streets therefor as far as practi.
cable: Id.
NAVIGABLE WATERS.

Riqhts of Riparian Owner under Laws of United States-Bridges,
Dams,&c.-Controlof State over- Ordinanceof 1787.-Under the laws
of the United States, the title of the purchaser of lands bordering on
a navigable stream stops at the edge of the stream, and does not extend
to the centre; but he has the same right to construct suitable landings
and wharies as riparian proprietors on navigable waters affected by the
tide: Wisconsin Imp. Co. v. Lyons, 30 or 31 Wis.
In holding that the title of the purchaser extends to the centre of the
stream, this court also held (Jones v. Pettibone, 2 Wis. 819), that he
took subject to the public right of navigation ; and this includes the
right of the public to do anything within the banks of the stream which
may be considered necessary for the benefit of commerce and navigaLion : Id.
The legislature has power to prohibit the erection of any dam, bridge
or other structure within or over any navigable stream, which may obstruct or impede the free navigation thereof: Td.
By the ordinance of 1787, the constitution of this state, the articles
of compact between it and the United States, and sec. 1, ch. 41, R. S.,
the Mississippi river and the navigable waters leading into it and the St.
Lawrence, are declared to be common highways, and for ever free, &c.,
and this description includes the Wisconsin river: Id.
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By see. 2, ch. 41, R. S., " all rivers and streams of water in this state,
in all places where the same have been meandered, and returned as
navigable by the surveyors employed by the United States government,"
are " declared navigable to such an extent that no dam, bridge or other
obstruction may be made in or over the same, without th permission of
the legislature." Dcfndant, without legislative permission, built a (]at
in the Wisconsin river at. a place where it is navigable in fact. Held,
that the erection and maintenance of such dam is unlawful, whether it
does or does not interfere with the navigation of the river : 11.
The plaintiff company having sustained damage from the erection and
maintenance of said dam, in the loss of tolls to the amount of $600.
may maintain an action for relief against the further construction and
maintenance thereof: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

See Bankruptcy; Contract; Insurance.
PRACTICE.

Trial by the Cburt instead of the Jury-Effect when the Court,consistin q
9 of two Judges,fail to agree.-Where a party, in virtue of article 30,
section 91, of the Code, elects to be tried by the court instead of the
jury, and the trial takes place, the court is substituted for the jury, and
has the same duties and functions to perform in passing upon the guilt
or innocence of' the accused ; and unless the party charged is determined to be guilty or not guilty, there can be no judgment either of
conviction or acquittal : Leaguev. State, 36 Md.
Where a party, indicted for murder, instead of being tried by the
jury, is tried by the court, consisting of two judges. and they fail to
agree, he is left in the-same position as if no trial had taken place. It
is in law a mais-trial, and a re-trial must of necessity be had: Id.
B1AILROAD.

Passenger-IRienoralfrom Railroad T9ra i-Damages.--Wh ere a
passenger went upon a train of cars, and offered a worthless piece of
paper, claiming it to be a pass, and on being informed that it was not a
pass, and the passenger refused to pay fare or leave the train, the serv.,nts of the company had a right to remove such passenger from the
train at a regular station, and they may use the necessary force fox the
purpose: Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. herring,
57 Ills.
In such a case it is error to instruct the jury, in estimating damages,
that they may consider whether the plaintiff in good faith believed she
had a pass, and offered it in good faith, although the paper was not a pass.
It was the duty of the passenger, on being inflormed that it was not a pass,
to either pay the fare or leave the train at the first station : Id.
If, in such a ease, the employees of a railroad use more force than is
necessary, then the company would be liable to damages, and the question of the good faith of the passer.ger, believing she had a valid pass, is
wholly immaterial in assessing damages : Id.
It is not error in such a case to instruct tie jury, that if the servants
wilfully and negligently injured plaintiff, they would be authorized to
give exemplary damages ; as they. were engaged in the furtherance and
execution of the business of tlhe company, the company were liahle for
the misconduct and negligence of their servants when thus engaged : d
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REPLEVIN.

Evi dence-Pleadings.-Theaverment in a plea in a replevin suit, of
property in the defendant, being but inducement to a traverse of the
averment in the declaration of property in the plaintiff, and such plea
having put plaintiff to the proof of property in himself, any evidence
which tends to show the plaintiff is not the owner is legitimate. and it
is error to reject it on the trial of the issue: Constantine v. .Fster,57
Ills.
The 14th section of the Practice Act, R. S. 1845, does not change
the rules of pleading in the action of replevin, so as to require a plea of
property in a stranger, before such proof can be made, wher6 the ownership of the plaintiff is travirsed: Id
When the averment in the declaration of ownership by the plaintiff
is traversed, he is put on proof of title against the world, and he must
prove title to recover; in a plea of property in the defendant, or a
stranger traversing plaintiff's ownership, the only issuable fact in the
plea is the plaintiff's ownership, and he must recover on his title. and
the burden of the proof is on him: Id.
Under such an issue it is error to prevent the defendant from proving
property in a third person. It is pertinent to the issue, and tends to
prove the plaintiff was not the owner, and even under the plea of non
detinet, it is competent for the defendant to prove that the plaintiff is
not entitled to possession of the property: Id.
RIPARIAN OWNER.

See Navqable Waters.

See Admiralty.
Bill of Lading-Ship's Bill -The contract between a ship and the
shipper is that which is contained in the bills of lading delivered to the
shipper. The bill retained by the ship, or "ship's bill," as it is sometimes called, is designed only for its own information and convenience;
not for evidence, as between the parties, of what their agreement was.
If it differs from the others, they must be considered as the true and
only evidence of the contract: 7Te Nihames, 14 Wall.
By issuing bills of lading for merchandise, stipulating for a delivery
to order, the ship becomes bound to deliver it to no one who has not the
order of the shipper. It is no excuse for a delivery to the wrong persons that the endorsee of the bills of lading was unknown, and that
notice of the arrival of the merchandise could not be given to him.
Diligent inquiry for the consignee, at least, is a duty. And if, after
inquiry, the consignee or the endorsee of a bill of lading for delivery to
order cannot be found, the duty of the carrier is to retain the goods
until they are claimed, or to store them prudently for and on account of
their owner. lie has no right, under any circumstances, to deliver them
to a stranger: Id.
The endorsee of a bill of lading may libel the vessel on which the
goods are shipped, for failure to deliver them, though he may be but an
agent or trustee of the goodF for others; as, ex. gr., the cashier of a
bank: Id.
SHIPPING.

SLAVE.

See Husband and WMfe.
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STAIMP.

Stanping by Collector ofter Execution of Paper-Endorsement oJ
Note.-The 5th section of the Act of July 14th 1870, 16 Stat. at Large
257, by which the power of collectors of internal revenue to post-stamp
certain instruments of writing and remit penalties for the non-stamping
of them when issued, is extended in point of time, applies to notes issued
before the passage of the act as well as to notes issued subsequently:
Pugh v. Me Cormick, 14 Wall.
An endorsement of a promissory note need not be stamped under any
existing statutes of the United States: Id.
Nor a waiver in writing, by an endorser, of demand of payment and
notice of dishonor: Id.
STATUTE.
STREET.

See Error.

See Municipal Corporation.

SUPREME COURT OF UNITEL STATES.
Error to State Courts-Faith and Credit to Proceedings in other
tates.-To bring a case here under the 25th section of the Judiciary
Act, on the ground that the provision of the Constitution which ordains
that "full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state," has been
violated by a refusal of the highest state court to give proper effect to a
judicial record of another state, it is necessary that it appear that the
record have been authenticated in the mode prescribed by the Act of
May 26th 1790, "to prescribe the mode in which the public acts,
records and judicial proceedings in each state shall be authenticated, so
as to take effect in every other state :" Caperton v. Ballard, 14 Wall.

TAx TITLE.

See iAfortgage.

TowNsHIP.

See Hlighway.

TRUST.
Commissions- Use of loney by Tr'ustee in hs owon Business- 1il
not be removed for eve y violation of Duty.-A cestui gue trust is entitled
to have the interest on the fund held in trust for her, paid to her yearly.
without any deductions for commissions, until commissions are allowed
and settled by the proper court: Lathrop v. Smalley, 8 C. E. Green.
A trustee who uses the trust fund in his own business, like any other
debtor, must seek the cestui que trust to pay the interest. Id.
A trustee who, contrary to the directions of the will, fails to invest
the fund, but in flagrant violation of the trust, uses the money in his
own business, is not entitled to commission: Id.
The trustee using the trust fund, having retained the interest, must
pay interest upon it from the day it became due : Id.
A trustee will not be removed for every violation of duty. For acts
done in bad faith, or that have diminished or endangered the trust fund
without bad faith, it is the duty of the court to remove him : Id.
But when it appears that the trustee is a responsible man, of large
property, and engaged in no hazardous business, and that the fund has
not been in any danger, and that he supposed the money was as safe in
hia hands as in any investment he could 'make, and that retaining it

.ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

would save expenses to the fund, his good faith is not impeached and he
will not be removed : Id.
Whether a co-trustee, who has paid no attention to the fund, but left
its administration entirely in the hands of the acting trustee, will be removed, depends upon the conduct of the acting trustee. Under the
circumstances of this case he will not be removed: Id.
Vexatious and troublesome conduct on the part of a trustee may be
good grounds for removing him from the trust, but held insufficient for
that purpose in this case: Id.
The fund must be invested on bond and mortgage at the highest rate
of interest allowed by law, if such investment can be procured, and so
as not to be subject to taxes if the trustee resides in a part of the state
where such exemption exists: Id.
USAGE.

Express Contracts-Presumptionsfrom U'sage-sury.-In actions
upon express contracts, proof of usage is admitted on the ground that it
serves to explain and ascertain the intent of the parties upon some point
as to which their contract is silent: Lamb v. .Klaus, 30 or 31 Wis.
The usage shown should be so long-continued and well known and
settled, and uniformly acted upon, as to raise a presumption that it was
known to both contracting parties, and that their contract was made
with reference to it: Id.
It is not necessary, however, to show how long a usage has continued,
if it is otherwise shown to have been known to the parties and their
contract made with reference to it: Id.
Where there is a written contract to manufacture and deliver goods,
and money is advanced thereon, a usage to pay interest on such
advances at ten per cent. is not contrary to the terms of the written
contract, although nothing is said of interest therein : I.
Where the party who made the advances claimed by his pleading that
there was a mistake in the written contract, and that the obligation to
pay interest at ten per cent. should have been expressed therein, and
asked to have the instrument reformed, and this equitable issue was first
tried and determined against him, the court adjudging that the written
contract "expressed fully the intentions of the parties, and was the real
contract between them :" .eld, that this must be construed to mean
merely that the written contract expresses all that the parties meant to
express therein; and it does not estop either party from proving a usage
which entered into the agreeaient: Id.
A usage to pay ten per cent. interest on advances is like any other
unwritten promise to pay that rate, and is good to enforce payment of
interest at seven per cent., the rate allowed by law where there is an
obligation to pay interest and no written agreement for a higher rate: d
Usuny.

See Usage.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

See iMlortgage.

Delivery-Intention to part with Title.-Under a contract that A.
shall get out logs and deposit them at a certain spot, and that as fast as
they are so deposited the title shall vest in B., the actual deposit of the
togs by A. at the place named passes the title to B.; and it makes no

